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1. Introduction 
Research on the role of fairness in organizational settings has the potential to widen our 
understanding of the elements influencing the well-being of the actors involved. Workers are 
among the main actors participating in the setting up of organizations, and the study of the 
determinants of their well-being is paramount when the role of fairness is considered. In this 
study, the influence of workers’ perceived fairness on their on-the-job well-being, as a proxy for 
utility, is considered. In turns, well-being is measured by satisfaction with the job and loyalty in 
terms of willingness to stay with the organization. For the first time, the relevance of fairness is 
tested against data that concern a sample of organizations in the Italian social service sector.  
The dataset, which will be fully described in section 4, comprises information about worker 
satisfaction and loyalty, which are used as success indicators, and worker perceived fairness, 
whose influence is assessed together with the wage and effort. Supplementary information 
concerns socio-demographic, individual and organizational aspects. The primary objective of the 
paper is to narrow the gap separating theoretical elaboration and experimental results on the 
nature and features of fair behavior on the one hand,1 and the empirical testing of its relevance in 
                                                
1 At the theoretical and experimental level, the study of fair behavior has recently acquired paramount importance. 
Three streams of inquiry can be singled out. A first stream tries and explain fairness starting from purely self-seeking 
behavior. In a recent book, Binmore (2005) explains fair behavior and the institutions thereof as processes of 
equilibrium selection in repeated games. The second stream starts from the observation that fair behavior is based on 
reciprocity, which is defined as the attitude of the individual to be kind when she is treated kindly, and to be unkind 
when she is treated unkindly (Rabin, 1993). The third stream, close to the behaviourist one, agrees with the second 
that individual behavior cannot be understood solely on the basis of self-seeking preferences (Ben-Ner and 
Putterman, 1999; Gintis, 2005; Seabright, 2005) but goes beyond fairness as reciprocity because it explicitly works 
on intrinsic motivations and distinguishes them from extrinsic ones (Deci, 1975; Deci and Ryan, 1985). In this 
stream, Ben-Ner and Putterman (1999) describe individual behavior as driven by three different types of preference: 
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organizational settings on the other hand. 
A second research objective will be pursued at the comparative level, given the presence of 
different organizational forms in the sector considered, which is mainly populated by public and 
non-profit organizations.2 The empirical analysis compares organizational features, socio-
demographic characteristics and perceptions of workers, and their differing impacts in different 
organizational forms. The envisaged importance of the differences between public and non-profit 
organizations is fully confirmed. On the other hand, fairness is found to crucially influence 
satisfaction and loyalty in both organizational forms. 
The rationale of the comparative analysis is also found in the specific nature of nonprofits, 
which are likely to constitute the principal setting for testing the relevance of fairness. There are 
two reasons for this: first, non-selfish motives are expected to be dominant in non-profit 
organizations (Hansmann, 1980; Preston, 1989; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; Frank, 1996), and, 
correspondingly, several empirical studies on fairness deal with non-profit organizations. Second, 
nonprofits organizations are often found to pay lower salaries, and fairness may be a crucial 
ingredient of the incentive mix used to motivate workers (Mirvis, 1992; Borzaga and Tortia, 
2006). Indeed, the main upshot of the analysis is that when the significance of fairness of 
procedures and organizational routines is taken into account, workers can no longer be described 
                                                                                                                                                        
self- regarding, other-regarding and process-related. Finally, Grimalda and Sacconi (2005) introduce the idea of 
conformist preferences, describing individuals as seeking compliance with moral principles conditional on the 
expectation of like compliance by other agents. Conformist preferences are taken to characterize organizations like 
non-profit ones, where the profit motive, hence self-seeking preferences, are not dominant. 
2 The Italian social service sector also comprises a small number of for-profit organizations. These represent about 
4% of the organizations and 5% of the workforce in the sector. Because for-profit firms are overrepresented in our 
sample (Table 1), the data do not allow satisfactory analysis, which will be restricted to non-profit and public 
organizations.  
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as driven solely by self-seeking motivations. If the workers’ assessment of the fairness of norms 
established within the organization is relevant to their well-being, and possibly effort levels, then 
it is necessary to consider the weight of not-self-seeking motivations in evaluating their behavior. 
 
A pressing methodological question in this context is how worker utility and fairness concerns 
can be measured empirically. The traditional economic view is that utility must be ordinal and 
inferred from observed behavior, not measured directly: self-reported scores for satisfaction, 
willingness to stay and perceived fairness are used, because objective proxies for subjective 
variables are not available, and where they are available, they may show severe limitations. This 
notwithstanding, satisfaction measures are increasingly accepted as suitable proxies for utility 
(Oswald, 1997; Frey and Stutzer, 2002, Binswanger, 2006), since they are reported to overlap in a 
robust way with more traditional, objective measures of well-being (Lelkes, 2006). This study is 
one of the first to introduce subjective measures of fairness and the willingness to stay with the 
organization adds a second subjective proxy for well-being on-the-job. 
The paper is organized as follows: after the introduction, Section 2 briefly surveys the 
literature on fairness in organizational settings, and introduces the theoretical scheme 
underpinning the study; Section 3 presents the descriptive part of the empirical work; Section 4 
discusses the measures of procedural and distributive fairness used in the econometric analysis of 
the factors influencing workers’ satisfaction and loyalty is presented (Section 5). The empirical 
findings are then connected with theory in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Fairness in organizational settings: the record to date 
Assessment of the role of fairness in organizations arose in connection with the study of pay 
structures, relative wages, and references wages. Within the more orthodox economic approach, 
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Milgrom and Roberts (1990) attempt to identify the advantages of the decision processes that 
permit rent-seeking, and to incorporate this into a cost-benefit analysis of optimal decision 
processes. Equity criteria are endogenously defined by organizations in order to generate 
efficiency: they constrain rent-seeking and are a substitute for less “open” (i.e. more hierarchical) 
organizational processes. Equity should never go as far as stunting incentives to pursue 
organizational objectives. On the other hand, it can in many cases lead to the first best solution, 
by limiting resistance to change and allowing the implementation of new proposals that do not 
damage the other interested parties.  Akerlof and Yellen (1984, 1990) move away from the 
orthodox stream. Starting from a critique of efficiency wages, they highlight the role of gift 
exchange and reciprocity between employers and employees, and of fair wages, to remedy the 
inability of traditional microeconomic models to account for higher than minimum work effort 
and wages above marginal products. Fair treatment increases worker morale and, consequently, 
effort. Frank (1984)  argues that egalitarian internal wage structures arise because of “equity” 
considerations, a concept that he equates with that of status; Stark (1990) takes account of relative 
status deprivation in order to explain why workers are usually not paid their marginal product; 
Frank (1996) provides compelling evidence that compensating wage differentials are due to the 
necessity to abide with social responsibility on the job; Levine (1991) argues that group 
cohesiveness and lower wage dispersion increase efficiency in participatory firms, thereby 
explaining involuntary unemployment among blue collars, who are paid above-market wages in 
order to boost their compliance with the firm’s objectives. In some studies, worker satisfaction as 
a proxy for individual well-being is connected with distributive fairness. Clark and Oswald 
(1996) show that workers well-being is negatively influenced by comparison wage rates, which 
depend on the wage paid to fellow workers within the organization. 
Some studies have analyzed the role of fairness in different types of organization. Most of 
them deal with nonprofits, since these have often been associated with a higher degree of 
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distributive fairness (Leete, 2000), intrinsic motivations and ideological drives (Rose-Ackermann, 
1996). Leete (2000) takes wage dispersion as the relevant proxy for comparing the different 
degrees of distributive fairness characterizing different organizational forms. The hypothesis is 
that non-profit organizations rely on the collaboration of intrinsically motivated employees. 
Intrinsic motivations are thought to be supported by a higher degree of wage equity, which is a 
proxy for fairness, since a strong dispersion of monetary remuneration would stunt motivations 
different from monetary ones, in a manner similar to the crowding-out effect hypothesized by 
Frey (1997). Labor market data from the 1990 US Census confirm the hypothesis, since a 
negative and significant spread between non-profit organizations and for profit-firms is shown, 
while the average level of monetary remuneration is similar in the two organizational forms. The 
differences in variance are as wide as 20% for executives, and 14% for white collar workers as a 
whole. It declines to 3% in the case of blue collars. In Leete’s study, wage dispersion is the only 
aspect that represents a fairer work environment, while the role of non-monetary aspects, for 
example linked to organizational processes, is merely assumed. A second limitation is the 
assumption that lower wage dispersion is always synonymous with fairer work environment. This 
assumption abstracts from the real features of distributive processes, since, in principle, also 
higher wage dispersion can be fairer depending on the characteristics of the workforce and of the 
production process. Furthermore, Leete does not present any evidence on how wage equity is 
perceived by workers. Finally, the influence of fairness on worker well-being is not analyzed.  
These works are nearer to the traditional economic approaches, which identify a causal link 
between effort and monetary incentives. They are mainly concerned with  outcomes, and 
therefore with distributive fairness. A few, much more recent, studies deal with the fairness of 
procedures. They examine non-monetary aspects of the job, and confirm a positive impact on 
worker morale and effort. Notably, some recent studies explicitly introduce the idea of procedural 
utility (Benz, Frey and Stutzer, 2004), which states that people value not only actual outcomes, 
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i.e. the “what”, but also the conditions and processes which led to these outcomes, i.e. the 
“how”. Procedural utility refers to the non-instrumental pleasures and displeasures of processes. 
The only applied study carried out on this same concept in the realm of work organization is the 
one by Benz and Stutzer (2003),3 who work on the 1998 UK WERS (Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey). They find that worker satisfaction with pay is positively and significantly 
influenced by procedural factors such as the frequency of being asked about pay issues by 
superiors. The procedural factor is a proxy for the strength of consultation processes and the 
clarity of procedures followed in fixing wages and wage changes. This result is obtained over and 
above the influence of pay itself, which is positive and significant. Hence procedural utility is 
valued independently of pay and other instrumental elements of well-being. Besides, just one 
item representing procedural utility is introduced, and the results, which do not distinguish among 
different organizational forms, concern pay-satisfaction alone, not overall satisfaction with the 
job.4     
The importance of fairness in organizational settings emerging from the above-cited studies 
enables the formulation of new tentative hypotheses concerning the relation between fairness and 
                                                
3 Frey and Stutzer (2005) apply the concept of procedural utility to the political sphere, showing that participation 
rights in political processes have a positive and significant effect on citizens’ well-being, measured as satisfaction 
with life in general. 
4 Other studies consider the determinant of job satisfaction, without making the role of fairness explicit, however. 
Benz (2005) tests the determinants of job satisfaction using two large datasets for the whole US and UK economies 
(the National Longitudinal Study on Youth for the US and the British Household Panel Survey for the UK), 
comparing nonprofit and for-profit workers. His main finding is that workers in nonprofit organizations are indeed 
more satisfied with their jobs than their counterparts in for-profit firms. The result is robust with respect to 
differences in monetary compensation and fringe benefits, and to different personal characteristics in the non-profit 
and for-profit sectors.  The work by Benz goes some way towards identifying the determinants of job satisfaction. 
However, it lacks empirical evidence on worker motivations and fairness. 
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worker on-the job well-being. Traditional theories, such as the neoclassical theory of individual 
labor supply, the principal-agent model (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), or the efficiency wage 
theory (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), used to consider the relation between workers’ effort and the 
wage, which was seen as the sole factor able to motivate workers in their activity. Workers’ 
utility (U ) was a positive function of the wage ( w ) and a negative function of effort ( e ), while 
the relation between effort and the wage was positive, but only in some specifications of those 
models, as in the efficiency wage one: 
),( ewUU =  where 0>
∂
∂
w
U  and 0<
∂
∂
e
U  
These theories disregarded the non monetary aspects of the job, and effort was seen as being 
driven exclusively by monetary remuneration. Furthermore, only objective measures were used 
for the monetary aspects (the level of the wage), while no account was taken of subjective 
evaluations. The role of non-monetary motivations was introduced in economics initially by 
Pagano (1985), and then by Frey (1997) and has acquired momentum in recent years (Ben-Ner 
and Putterman, 1999; Gui and Sugden, 2005). 
Starting from these observations, utility can be hypothesized as influenced not only by the 
salary and effort levels, but also by the fairness of distributive processes and procedures.  
),,( fewUU = where 0>
∂
∂
f
U  
where f  is a vector of indexes representing distributive and procedural fairness. The 
organizational form is likely to have a relevant impact as well by modifying the magnitude of 
some coefficients and, in some cases, the functional relations. Some of these differences will 
emerge through comparison between public and non-profit organizations. A formal model will 
not be developed and tested. However, the results of the empirical analysis will be used to 
develop new theoretical hypotheses serving as heuristic devices for future research at both the 
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theoretical and empirical level (Malerba, 2005). 
 
3. The research: structure and descriptive results 
The research whose results are presented in this paper was conducted in 1998 on the social-
welfare and educational service sector in Italy. It involved 228 organizations (for a total of 268 
operational units) operating in 15 Italian provinces.5 Separate questionnaires were also 
administered to 2066 paid workers. Table 1 shows the organizational types and their workforces. 
Table 1 about here 
The Italian social services sector is characterized by a predominance of nonprofit 
organizations. Roughly one-fourth of the total number of organizations are public, while for-
profit firms constitute only a tiny fraction.6 Nonprofit organizations amount to about 70% of the 
total.7 Publicly-owned organizations are controlled by administrative authorities and are 
characterized by a higher monetary remuneration than in nonprofits and by quite rigid 
hierarchical structures governed by public managers. Non-profit organizations have a declared 
                                                
5 The dataset was created at the University of Trento, Department of Economics, in years 1998 and 1999, by ISSAN, 
Institute for the Development of Nonprofit Organizations, in collaboration with FIVOL, Italian Foundation for 
Voluntary Work, and FEO, European Foundation for Employment. 
6 The database encloses also 17 for-profit firms with 188 workers.   
7 In the dataset, non-profit organizations can be further sorted into three types: religious nonprofits, other lay (or non-
religious) nonprofits, and social cooperatives, which are the most frequent in our database employing about a half of 
the total number of workers in nonprofits. This more refined distinction will not be made explicit in the rest of the 
paper, so as not to widen the scope of the analysis excessively. The structural-operational definition suggested by 
Anheier and Salomon (1992) proves sufficient. Under this definition, non-profit organizations share some important 
characteristics: they are formal, private, nonprofit-distributing, self-governing, voluntary, and mission oriented. 
Furthermore, nonprofits are often supported by volunteer work.  
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social mission which is underpinned by the non-profit distribution constraint (Weisbrod, 1975; 
Hansmann, 1980). Organizational protocols tend to be flat, and horizontal coordination prevails 
over top-down decision-making by the management. Participation and worker involvement  is 
often an important part of this model.  Wage differentials are minor, and pay rates are correlated 
more to functional differentiation than to hierarchical positions.  
The questionnaires gathered detailed information  on the characteristics of organizations, the 
occupational and socio-demographic features of workers, and their well-being. Table 2 shows the 
workers’ main characteristics: the predominance of female workers is immediately apparent, 
though nonprofits show a higher ratio of male work. There is a predominance of middle aged 
workers (36 to 50 years old), though workers in nonprofits are younger than those in the public 
sector. The most frequent educational qualification is the high-school diploma. Nonprofits have a 
higher occurrence of unskilled and graduated workers with respect to the public sector. Workers 
with specific training for work in social services are the rule in the public sector (about 75% of 
cases), and they represent the majority of cases in the sector as a whole. Full-time employment 
contracts are also the rule (three-fourths of cases), with marginal variations by organizational 
form. 
Table 2 about here 
As regards wages (Table 3), empirical research has shown that pay is lower in nonprofits than 
in public organizations delivering the same services (Levine, 1991; Leete, 2000). Our results 
confirm these findings. Wages in the public sector are higher than in nonprofits, and display 
lower dispersion, at least as far as the hourly wage is considered. The ratio of the standard 
deviation to the average hourly wage is similar across organizational forms, though nonprofits 
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show a slightly higher value.8 Workers in the nonprofit sector seem to face a higher degree of risk 
concerning their monetary remuneration because of higher market pressure and the lower 
incidence of soft budget constraints (Kornaj, 1986). Given the assumption of risk-averse workers, 
if their well-being depended exclusively on the monetary remuneration, a lower degree of 
satisfaction would be expected in the nonprofit sector, but this is not confirmed by our data. 
Table 3 about here 
Proxies for workers’ effort are reported in Table 4. The first proxy for effort is the number of 
excess weekly effective work-hours with respect to contractual work-hours. This variable shows 
a limited number of excess work-hours in the sector and little variation across organizational 
forms. The second proxy is the number of absentee work-days outside contractual vacations. A 
higher number of absentee work-days represents lower effort. The average for the whole sample 
is 11 days. However, in this case strong variation by organizational form is observed: workers in 
the public sector take a number of annual absences that is almost double that of workers in 
nonprofits.   
Table 4 about here 
Workers’ well-being is indexed by self-reported satisfaction scores (Table 5). The database 
records satisfaction with the job as a whole, plus a list of 14 items concerning satisfaction with 
various job characteristics. Workers’ well-being is hypothesized as depending on two main 
components and the items of satisfaction were accordingly sorted into two groups: the first 
represents the material component and includes monetary and non-monetary incentives; the 
                                                
8 Comparisons have been performed between the public sector and non-profit organizations. Leete (2000) compares 
wage dispersion in non-profit and for-profit firms. Wage dispersion was calculated for for-profit firms in our sample, 
and it proved to be slightly lower than in nonprofit organizations. Hence our results do not confirm Leete’s findings 
(see also Mosca and Pastore, 2003, on the same data).  
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second corresponds to the immaterial component (happiness) and includes the aspects of the 
working environment contributing to workers’ self-respect and auto-affirmation, proxied by 
elements such as workers’ involvement in the activity of the firm, professional growth and the 
relational aspects of the job. These immaterial aspects are nonetheless able to generate 
satisfaction, and consequently to increase well-being.9  The classification is not drawn up on an 
ex-ante basis alone. Categorical principal components analysis (CatPCA) was run on the items of 
satisfaction. The results of the analysis (in Appendix B) are coherent with the partition introduced 
here.10 The items of material satisfaction appear in the first and in the third component, while the 
items of happiness are concentrated in the second component.11   
                                                
9 A similar classification is based on the so-called “two factors model” and distinguishes between intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations. If applied in the present study, material satisfaction would have rewarded extrinsic 
motivations, while happiness would have rewarded intrinsic motivations. Also the classification drawn up by Ben-
Ner and Putterman (1999) could be used. This distinguishes between other regarding, self-regarding and process-
regarding preferences. Given the database at hand, the item of satisfaction would have been sorted into process-
related aspects of the job, and self-regarding aspects. 
10 The significance of the CatPCA was tested by means of reliability analysis. The Cronbach Alpha for the first three 
components was comprised between 0.7, and 0.8, showing a good degree of significance. 
11 An exception is represented by the items of relational satisfaction, which were put in the group used to calculate 
happiness, although in the CatPCA they appear in the first component because they are likely to constitute part of the 
workers’ (non-material) remuneration (Borzaga and Depedri, 2005). The reason for this shift is that they represent an 
immaterial component of satisfaction. This partition improves the empirical analysis in section 5 since the wage has a 
positive impact on material satisfaction when the items of relational satisfaction are excluded, while its impact 
becomes not significant when they are added. On the other hand, the qualitative results do not vary when the items of 
relational satisfaction are included in the happiness component. Hence the exclusion of the items of relational 
satisfaction from material satisfaction allows better isolation of the influence exerted by some variables. For more 
detailed analysis of the relation between satisfaction and incentive mixes on the same data see in Borzaga and Tortia 
(2006).  
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Table 5 about here 
In broad terms, the data show that workers are more satisfied with the items of happiness than 
with the material aspects of the job. The level of the wage, past and future career advancements 
seem to create the greatest dissatisfaction, while workers appreciate working-hours arrangements 
and the degree of job security. As for the items of happiness, satisfaction proves to be highest as 
far as the social usefulness of the job and the relational aspects are concerned. At the comparative 
level, the most important result is that the public sector exhibits a lower degree of satisfaction for 
all the items, both material and immaterial. The only weak exception is represented by job 
security, since the public sector protects jobs much better than does the private sector in general. 
On the other hand, major gaps are found for past and future career advancement and for the 
immaterial items, such as relations with superiors.    
Table 6 about here 
As regards loyalty (Table 6), the majority of workers want to stay with their organizations as 
long as possible, and 74% would like to stay for at least some years. On the other hand, one third 
of workers would quit if a better job opportunity (in the same sector or in another sector) arose. 
Comparatively, workers show a higher degree of loyalty in nonprofits, while about 40% of 
workers in the public sector would prefer to quit.12   
 
4. The measure of distributive and procedural fairness 
Fairness can be observed in relation to diverse aspects of the working activity. Here, 
distributive and procedural fairness are considered. Various authors have dealt with different 
                                                
12 Many workers in the public sector are likely to be willing shift to a different job with the same position in the 
public sector, since it offers higher pay and job security. 
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concepts of fairness, which was first analyzed in the psychological literature (Thibaut and 
Walker, 1975; Lynd and Tyler, 1988). Distributive fairness is usually defined as the relation 
between outputs and inputs in comparison to the same relation for a certain reference group. If 
outcomes are distributed fairly the ratio of outputs to inputs (for example the ratio of the wage to 
effort) would tend to equalize across individuals (Adams, 1963, 1965; Solari, 2003). Distributive 
fairness can also be defined subjectively, as the fairness of outputs to inputs perceived by a single 
worker. This latter definition will be used in the present study. On the other hand, procedural 
fairness is usually referred to as a property of relations which guarantee fair outcomes, but it can 
also be referred to the quality of procedures, for example as far as the circulation of information 
is concerned, disregarding outcomes (Tyler and Blader, 2000; Solari, 2003). Here the former 
concept of procedural fairness will be adopted.  
Measures of fairness can be objective or subjective. The literature contains some examples of 
objective measures of distributive fairness. Relative status deprivation (Stark,1990), 
compensating wage differentials (Frank,1996) and comparison wage rates (Clark and 
Oswald,1996) constitute a first group of measures of distributive equity. Various versions of 
relative wages are the key variable when equity judgments are to be expressed, since workers do 
not pay attention to their own pay level alone, as more traditional theoretical streams would have 
it. The equity of wage structures can be represented not only in relative terms but also in absolute 
terms with a measure of wage dispersion. Egalitarian wage structures (Frank, 1984), group 
cohesiveness (Levine, 1991) and the direct measurement of wage dispersion (Leete, 2000) make 
up a second group of measures. Objective measures have at least one important drawback: they 
do not give a fruitful representation of the perception of fairness felt by the involved actors, and 
hence of their judgments and possible consequences on their actions. Furthermore, objective 
proxies for procedural fairness are still harder to define and more questionable than proxies for 
distributive fairness. Subjective measures eschew these limitations. But they may have other 
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drawbacks, such as casual or systematic overestimation or underestimation of the degree of 
fairness present in a certain organization. They may also be biased because of idiosyncrasies in 
individual perceptions not linked to the phenomenon under investigation or because of the 
presence of different latent unspecified determinants. However, as shown by Oswald (1997) in 
his seminal contribution, these may not be sufficient reasons for not using subjective measures. 
First of all, casual mistakes are likely to constitute random gaps from the true value and to 
compensate each other. Second, systematic mistakes (over or underestimation) do not influence 
the final results as long as the measurement scale is ordinal. Idiosyncrasies may bias the results, 
but this problem is present in the case of objective measures as well. The best remedy for this 
problem is the availability of longitudinal data, but unfortunately they are not available for this 
study. Finally, also misspecification of the model is a problem common to both objective and 
subjective measures. Eventually, subjective measures may not be confidently used only if 
individuals are assumed to respond irrationally, which obviously cannot be taken for granted. As 
for empirical test using subjective measures of fairness, few of them are found in the literature 
and all of them are used to test the determinants of fairness: Hampton and Heywood (1993, 1999; 
Verhoogen et al. (2002); Paul (2006) estimate wage-fairness perception equations and find that 
the wage together with gender, race and age are the main determinants of perceived unfair wages. 
The negative impact of comparison wage is not confirmed in all studies. However, neither of 
these studies test the impact of fairness perceptions on job satisfaction, and all of them employ 
fairness perceptions that concern the monetary remuneration alone. All non-monetary aspects of 
fairness such as the procedural ones are left out of the picture.       
If subjective measures of fairness are accepted, then their relation with worker satisfaction can 
be analyzed and evaluated. In this study, the concept of fairness is taken to be a complex one 
comprising different dimensions which were specifically surveyed. Two sets of questions were 
present in the original questionnaire (section IV and V, reported full-length in Appendix A). They 
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do not refer explicitly to fairness, but are intended to measure the perception of the equity of 
distribution and procedures. The first set explores how workers judge organizational protocols, 
involvement processes, flow of information, and other procedures within the organization. It can 
be interpreted as pertaining to procedural fairness (Table 8). The second set deals with 
distributive processes within the organizations: the questions asked workers to evaluate how well 
their remuneration corresponded to their contribution in terms of effort, competencies and 
experience, etc. They can be interpreted as pertaining to distributive fairness (Table 7).13 This 
partition is borne out by Solari’s (2003) study on the same dataset. Principal components analysis 
is used to show that the items of the two sets of questions exactly sort into two meta-dimensions14 
which correspond to procedural and distributive fairness. Given this robust result, it is possible to 
build two indexes calculated as mean values of the single items and representing the components 
of fairness used in the econometric analysis in Section 5. 
 
Table 7 about here 
Descriptive analysis of distributive and procedural fairness shows that, in general, mean scores 
are relatively low when compared, for example, to the items of satisfaction (Table 5): an at least 
one point difference on the 1 to 7 Lickert scale. This finding suggests that there is a major 
difficulty in satisfying workers’ expectations as far as fairness is concerned. Starting from 
                                                
13 Some items concerning procedural fairness can be understood as referring to outcomes (for example the balance of 
incentives to contribution, and professional growth and career), and therefore to distributive fairness. However, these 
items can also be understood as processes taking place within the organization, and hence related to procedural 
justice. Moreover, the cognitive frame of the question is not given in terms of outcomes, while the question on 
distributive fairness clearly refers to monetary remuneration. 
14 The robustness of the analysis is tested by means of reliability statistics, which turned out to be highly significant, 
with a Cronbach Alpha higher than 0.8 for both components.  
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distributive fairness, a strong variation among mean results is not recorded, though workers seem 
to be particularly dissatisfied with the monetary remuneration relative to the stress and tension on 
the job. This can be interpreted as confirming Akerlof and Yellen’s (1984) hypothesis on gift 
exchange, since wages in the sector are low and perceived as unfair when compared with effort. 
On the other hand, workers perceive a fairer distribution if the economic possibilities of the 
organization are considered. However, comparative data show that this latter effect is due to the 
perception of workers in nonprofit organization, who are aware of the economic possibilities of 
their organization much more than are public sector workers. In general terms, public sector 
workers show a significantly lower perception of distributive fairness on all the listed items.  
Table 8 about here 
As for procedural fairness, the results are generally lower and particularly dissatisfactory in the 
cases of the balance of incentives to contribution, the transparency of promotions and 
professional growth and career. However, the worst results are seemingly due to a further deficit 
of the public sector. While the average for nonprofits is only slightly lower than in the case of 
distributive fairness, the public sector displays a significant negative gap (2.9 vs 3.5) scoring 
strikingly low for the transparency of promotions, professional growth and career, and the 
balance of incentives to contribution. Taking into consideration the low values of the public 
sector for both distributive and procedural fairness, it seems that the inadequacies of 
organizational protocols may crowd out intrinsic motivations and induce workers to demand, and 
managers to concede, increasing extrinsic incentives (Frey, 1997). Indeed, wages in public sector 
are significantly higher than in the other organizational forms. 
The next section will introduce the econometric analysis of the influence of fairness on worker 
well-being. Given the definitions of distributive and procedural fairness and the partition of the 
items of satisfaction put forward in section 3, one would expect a relatively stronger influence of 
distributive fairness on the material components of satisfaction than on the happiness component.   
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5. The influence of fairness on worker satisfaction and loyalty 
The empirical analysis is carried out using OLS and ordered logit estimates. The linear analysis 
concerns the factors influencing the average index of satisfaction, material satisfaction and 
happiness,15 while ordered logit estimates are run when the dependent variables are overall 
satisfaction with the job and loyalty.16 The main objective is the evaluation of the influence of 
perceived fairness although also the influence of the wage, and of two proxies representing effort, 
is assessed. Finally, covariates include other control variables representing socio-demographic 
features of workers, and other personal and organizational characteristics. 
A positive and significant linkage between well-being and fairness is taken to show that 
organizations able to promote fairer organizational protocols are better able to motivate workers, 
thereby inducing higher involvement and a willingness to collaborate and pursue the 
organization’s objectives even in the presence of low salaries. Hence it can also represent an 
indirect test for increased efficiency.  
A criticism that can be made of the use of these measures of fairness as covariates influencing 
well-being is that they actually represent proxies for satisfaction and loyalty. It would not come 
as a surprise to find that the link between fairness and well-being is indeed strong. Here it should 
be noted that the questions concerning fairness (in Appendix A) were posed in order to elicit 
descriptively the subjective evaluation of objective features of the work environment and of 
                                                
15 The index of satisfaction? was calculated as the average of all the items of satisfaction presented in Table 5, while 
material utility and happiness were calculated as averages of the respective items. 
16 The dataset also comprised a separate item concerning satisfaction with the job as a whole. Since this item was 
ordered from 1 to 7, it was used to run ordered logit estimates, which are presented in the last column of tables 9 
through 11. 
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distributive processes. In other words, these questions did not ask how satisfied the worker was 
with those elements. In principle, a worker can perceive a high degree of fairness without being 
satisfied with his/her job, for example because he/she would prefer a higher salary. Indeed, as 
shown by Borzaga and Depedri (2005), many workers who want to quit their organizations are 
either satisfied with various aspects of their job or perceive a fair work environment. Hence, well-
being and fairness cannot be equated, and a positive linkage will be found only if a real influence 
between different variables occurs.  
The empirical analysis is conducted in a cross-section environment.17 As far as covariates were 
concerned, a sub-set of variables constituting the outcome of a pre-selection driven by our 
research questions was identified. The analysis of the full correlation matrix was then performed. 
This was a first step in dealing with collinearity and mis-specification problems. Correlation 
coefficients were no higher than 0.25 for all variables (hence collinearity was excluded), apart 
from the correlation between workers’ age and tenure in the organization, which was 0.41, and 
the correlation between the two indexes of fairness, which presented a zero level coefficient equal 
to 0.56.  
In particular, the following reduced form equation was estimated for the linear regressions: 
εβββββα ++++++= iiiiiiii FAIREFFORTWAGEORGPERSy 5454432211                             (1) 
where the dependent variable (y) represents the three different measures of worker satisfaction 
(mean index of satisfaction, material satisfaction and happiness). 
The reduced form for the ordered logit estimates is: 
miiiiiiiimm
FAIREFFORTWAGEORGPERSy εβββββτ ++++++−=Ω 5454432211)(ln             (2) 
                                                
17 Cross-sectional data are not suitable for investigation of strong causal linkages. Hence this endeavour will not be 
attempted. The econometric analysis was intended to determine statistical linkages and reciprocal influences. 
 20
where mΩln is the logit (i.e. the log of the odds) for the dependent variable y (overall work 
satisfaction and loyalty), which is linear in the estimated coefficients. mτ−  are the cut points for 
an ordered dependent variable. 
The meaning of the covariates is as follows: 
iPERS1  =  personal characteristics = age, gender, high school diploma, university degree, 
specific training, open-ended contract, tenure, wage 
iORG2  =  organizational characteristics = size (log of number of employees), log-age of the 
organization 
WAGE  =  hourly wage 
iEFFORT4  = proxies for effort = extra hour worked with respect to contractual work-hours, non-
vacation absentee work days 
iFAIR5  =  two indexes of fairness = distributive fairness, procedural fairness  
Starting from the socio-demographic variables in Table 9 (for the whole set of organizations), 
women prove to be more satisfied than men about the material aspects of the job, but not happier. 
This result is quite standard in the literature (Mirvis and Hackett, 1983). However, it is confirmed 
only for non-profit organizations in Table 11, but not for the public sector in Table 10. Age is 
positively related with satisfaction only in the case of happiness. Education seems to have a 
strong positive impact on happiness, but it reduces material satisfaction. It enhances self-
realization, but material rewards do not seem to keep up with intellectual growth. It is also 
possible that educated workers give more severe evaluation of the material conditions of work. 
The two contrasting effects cancel each other out and the overall effect on satisfaction is hardly 
significant: only the ordered logit estimates evidence a negative impact of university degree on 
satisfaction. Specific training has a strong negative impact on satisfaction, mainly in its happiness 
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component, evidencing a form of disillusion with the features of the job, which specifically 
trained worker expected to be more stimulating and creative. Being on open-end contract and 
tenure enhance material satisfaction, as expected. On the other hand, a long term relation 
damages happiness, probably because of burn-out and other failures in internal agency relations. 
However, the latter result is confirmed only for the public sector, while it is not significant in 
nonprofits, which prove better able to sustain good relations with workers also in the long run. As 
for organizational variables, larger size strongly reduces satisfaction in all its components, and for 
both organizational forms, while the age of the organization increases the material component of 
satisfaction, but only in nonprofits, probably because older organizations are better established 
and able to offer better conditions, while material conditions in the public sector are more 
uniform independently of the age of the workplace. 
Table 9 about here 
The effort variables have a relevant negative effect on satisfaction, as expected. Extra hours 
worked reduce well-being mainly in its material component. The negative impact is stronger in 
the public sector, while in nonprofits only the material component is affected significantly.18 On 
the other hand, the number of absentee workdays shows a much weaker influence: they enhance 
happiness by increasing the possibilities to cultivate extra-work activities. Hence, once again, 
nonprofits seem better able than the public sector to motivate workers. Involvement in the 
workplace makes effort less of a problem for workers’ well-being. The wage has a weak, though 
significant, positive effect on the material component of satisfaction, as expected. The effect is 
strong in the public sector, where the overall level of satisfaction is also affected, while it is 
                                                
18 These results confirm in general terms recent findings by Golden and Wiens-Tuers (2006), who find a significant 
and robust negative effect of mandatory extra hours on workers’ family well-being. However, these authors do not 
test directly the impact of extra hours on job satisfaction. 
 22
absent in non-profit organizations. Workers in the public sector are more sensitive to monetary 
remuneration, while workers in non-profits, taking account also of their lower wages, seem to be 
driven by different motives and are more sensitive to non-monetary incentives (Borzaga and 
Tortia, 2006).     
The role of both distributive and procedural fairness in influencing satisfaction turns out to be 
crucial for all the components of satisfaction, and for all organizational forms. Procedural fairness 
has the greatest coefficients, evidencing that workers pay attention first of all to procedures and 
only secondarily to outcomes when assessing the overall degree of organizational equity. The 
ordered logit estimates confirm these results. For example, when taking into consideration all 
organizational forms, the odds ratio shows that when the indexes of procedural and distributive 
fairness increase by one unit, the odds of having satisfaction increased by one unit grow by a 
factor of about 1.3 and 1.7 respectively. Neither does the relative weight of the effect of fairness 
on the different components of satisfaction show strong variation, though distributive fairness has 
a relatively stronger influence on material satisfaction than on happiness, as expected. As for 
organizational forms, well-being is deeply affected by fairness in both cases. Only a somewhat 
weaker, but still highly significant, effect of distributive fairness on happiness in the public sector 
is detected. The odds ratio in the ordered logit estimates shows that nonprofits reproduce exactly 
the effects found for the whole set of organizations, while in the public sector procedural fairness 
is relatively more important and distributive fairness is less important (the odds are 1.1 and 2.0 
respectively). This result can be linked to the figures shown in Table 8: the level of procedural 
fairness in the public sector is so low that workers feel that the lack of equity in procedures is a 
major problem. On the other hand, distributive fairness is relatively less important, given the 
standardized features of distribution in the public sector. 
Table 10 about here 
The comparative analysis evidences various weaknesses in the public sector relative to non-
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profit organizations. First of all education has a negative role in the public sector, while it 
enhances happiness in nonprofits. Hence, the material conditions of work seem to have greater 
weight in public organizations, and educated workers feel particularly dissatisfied with them. On 
the other hand, non-material and non-monetary aspects of the job emerge as more relevant in 
nonprofits, where educated workers feel happier because of better possibilities to fulfill their 
aspirations on the job. A second critical element distinguishing public from non-profit 
organizations is the impact of a long term contractual relation, which is negative in the public 
sector because of the influence on the happiness component. Cooperation between the workers’ 
and the organization in the long run is difficult to accomplish. Hence it is a good proxy for the 
organization’s ability to involve and motivate workers. This is shown clearly by the odds ratio in 
the ordered logit where the presence of the open-ended contract increases the probability of being 
more dissatisfied by a factor of about two. Third, effort impacts more negatively on worker well-
being in the public sector than in nonprofits, evidencing a lower degree of involvement and a 
lower weight of the non-material components of well-being. This is true even if workers in 
nonprofits work more extra hours and are absent for half the days of workers in the public sector 
(Table 4). Overall it seems that involvement and a flatter and more democratic governance 
structure help to increase workers’ well-being in non-profit organizations relative to the public 
sector by supporting non-material motivations and self-fulfillment.  
Table 11 about here 
An indirect, subjective measure of worker well-being is the stated strength of the relation 
between the worker and the organization in terms of willingness to stay or leave, given the 
relevant alternatives (Table 6). The direct measures of satisfaction so far presented have proved 
to strongly linked with the measures of perceived fairness. The use of an indirect measure of 
satisfaction as success variable can provide a further test, while also avoiding the criticism of the 
equivalence between stated satisfaction and perceived fairness that was previously discussed.  
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The mutually excluding alternatives concerning loyalty (reported in Appendix A) were ordered 
from five to one, since they represent the decreasing strength of the linkage between the worker 
and the organization, and they were used as dependent variables to run an ordered logit model 
whose covariates were equal to the regressions concerning satisfaction. The results are presented 
in Table 12 for all organizations and for the public and the non-profit sector separately. Starting 
from socio-demographic and other individual variables, age is positively linked with loyalty, as 
expected: as workers grow older outside options are less numerous and if they had desired to quit, 
they would already have left the organization. The effect of tenure, which is never significant, 
turns out to be weaker. Education is negatively related to loyalty and the effect is stronger in 
nonprofits. Better educated workers do have more opportunities, and this can increase their 
willingness to look for better jobs. Specific training is a necessary condition to gain employment 
in the public sector. Hence it is likely to increases the willingness to quit in nonprofits, where 
many workers may prefer the higher salaries and the better job protection offered by the public 
sector. Workers on open-ended contracts more often want to quit in the public sector, and this 
again evidences lack of involvement and greater difficulty in sustaining good long term relations 
with the organization. It is also possible that many of these workers are looking for different jobs 
in other sectors of the public segment of the economy, since they give greater weight to job 
security and monetary incentives. As for organizational variables, size is negatively related with 
loyalty, but only in the public sector, maybe because of the lower average size of nonprofits. 
Effort in the form of extra hours worked has a negative impact on loyalty only in the public 
sector, and this confirms the result found for satisfaction. When the number of absentee workdays 
is considered, a negative correlation with loyalty is detected, mainly in nonprofits. Given the 
positive correlation found in the case of satisfaction, it is possible to state that absentee workdays 
are more a proxy for disaffection than for effort: when there is disaffection, the reduction of effort 
increases satisfaction. At any rate, a different relation of the worker with non-profit relative to 
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public organizations is once again apparent, since not involvement, but material conditions are 
prevalent in the latter.  
Table 12 about here 
Distributive and procedural fairness are strongly significant in influencing fairness. Their 
impact is similar in the case of the whole sample. While distributive fairness retains a similar 
impact to that in the case of satisfaction, the influence of procedural fairness is reduced, although 
it is still extremely significant. This general result confirms previous findings (Borzaga and 
Depedri, 2005; Borzaga and Tortia, 2006)19 that material and monetary conditions are relatively 
more important for loyalty than for satisfaction. However, remarkable differences between 
organizational forms are hidden: distributive fairness is more important for public organizations, 
while procedural fairness is more important for nonprofits. Hence it seems that workers in the 
public sector consider first of all the fairness of monetary incentives when assessing the strength 
of their link with the organization. Since workers in the public sector show a greater propensity to 
quit their organizations than do workers in non-profits (Table 6), this effect may again be due to 
their willingness to quit social services but to stay in the public sector, which guarantees more 
protected jobs, professional growth and higher wages. On the other hand, procedures are 
standardized and are not perceived as a crucial factor in determining their position in the 
organization. As for workers in nonprofits, the result is greater sensitivity to procedures, which 
are felt to be a key factor influencing their position, since they are defined most of all at the level 
of the firm’s management. A second possible explanation of the same result is that that the 
motivations of workers in nonprofits are different from those of public sector workers: monetary 
oriented the latter, more of an intrinsic kind, hence stressing the relevance of procedures, the 
                                                
19 In these works it was shown that intrinsic motivations and the procedural part of the incentive mix have a strong 
impact on satisfaction, while material incentives become crucial in influencing loyalty.  
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former. Workers would self-select themselves in organizations with different characteristics.20 
 
6. Discussion 
The empirical analysis leads to interesting consequences at the theoretical level. The main 
result concerns the pervasive influence of fairness on worker well-being. Not only is fairness 
significant for all specifications of worker satisfaction, for loyalty to the organization, and for 
both organizational forms, but coefficient and odds ratios show that the impact is extremely 
strong. Procedural fairness appears to be relatively more important than distributive fairness in 
influencing satisfaction, even if the weight of distributive fairness increases in the case of 
material satisfaction, as expected. The fairness of organizational processes seems to be a more 
complete and comprehensive criterion for the assessment of organizational behavior. The 
definition of procedural fairness put forward in the paper does not exclude outcomes, since, for 
example, incentives, professional growth and capabilities are considered insofar as they are 
embedded, as outcomes, in organizational processes.21  
Second, different specifications of worker well-being are influenced by different factors. While 
material satisfaction is influenced by the objective features of the employment relationship and of 
the work environment (contract type, tenure, age of the organization, size, effort, wage), the non-
                                                
20 Also this second interpretation is well supported by the data, since the previous studies on the same dataset show 
that the motivations of workers choosing the public sector and nonprofits are quite different: the latter are 
significantly more sensitive to involvement and relations with users. 
21 Relevant theoretical arguments (Rabin, 1993), and experimental results (Falk et al., 2003) seem to support this line 
of enquiry. They show that not only do outcomes matter, but also the intentions of the actors concerned. Intentions 
are identified through not-chosen alternatives in experimental settings and define the processes through which 
outcomes are determined, as in Falk et al. (2003). Hence processes and the procedures devised to regulate them 
acquire momentum in the explanation of social interaction, the more so in organizational settings. 
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material components of satisfaction are mainly influenced by subjective features such as age, 
education and training. These results confirm the partition into two factors determined by the 
principal components analysis. 
Third, the role of the wage and of effort in influencing worker well-being is downplayed when 
compared with traditional theories. The wage shows a significant influence on well-being mainly 
in its material component, while it plays a role for overall satisfaction only in the public sector.22 
Effort, proxied by the number of excess work-hours, proves to be important in lessening material 
satisfaction, but it also appears to have a leading role in influencing overall satisfaction.23  
Fourth, institutional variation matters, since the results on the non-profit and the public sectors 
exhibit systematic differences, although these do not concern fairness. Different organizational 
forms seem to define different models where the institutional elements shift the influence of 
certain variables, in some cases inverting the sign of the linkage. In order to analyze the 
importance of different organizational forms further, the nonprofit dummy was introduced, taking 
into consideration all the specifications of worker well-being only for the data concerning public 
and non-profit organizations (i.e. a subset of the whole social service sector). The dummy is 
never significant. However, when the index of procedural fairness is eliminated, the dummy 
becomes highly significant. This is not the case of the index of distributive fairness: its 
elimination does not make the dummy significant. The same results are confirmed also using the 
data for the whole sector. In this respect it is even possible to state that the non-profit form is a 
                                                
22 The effect of the wage on workers’ satisfaction does not take account of the choices of the workers who would 
have wanted to work in the organization, but either quit or did not accept the job because of low monetary 
remuneration. If these data were available, it is likely that a stronger impact of the wage would have been observed.  
23 To be noted is that both the wage and effort in terms of extra-hours worked are never significant in the ordered 
logit estimates, which weight the influence of the other variables more. This provides further confirmation of the 
weaker linkage of the wage and effort with workers’ well-being.  
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proxy for the degree of procedural fairness. 
Generalizations about the factors that influence workers’ well-being are difficult to make on 
solid empirical grounds. However, other linkages, such as the one concerning fairness, emerge as 
robust and almost invariant with respect to institutional factors. In this respect it is possible to 
return to the theoretical scheme outlined in Section 3 and make it more general by taking the 
empirical findings into account. To keep the analysis as simple as possible, the impact of socio-
demographic and organizational control variables is not considered. Overall worker utility 
depends positively on two different components: material utility )( mS  and happiness )( hS . 
),( hm SSUU =  where 0>∂
∂
mS
U  and 0>
∂
∂
hS
U  
In their turn material utility and happiness depend on different factors, which can be 
exemplified as follows: 
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This first specification of worker satisfaction is quite close to the traditional one, since the 
positive linkage with the wage and the negative impact of effort, indexed by extra work-hours, 
are as expected, though only in the linear regressions and not in the ordered logit estimates. The 
effect of the wage is weaker than that of the other two variables. The positive relation with the 
wage is questionable, because it is found not to be significant in non-profit organizations. 
However, it is possible to retain this relation because it turns out to be significant for the entire set 
of organizations. The crucial component representing fairness is lacking in the traditional 
formulation and needs to be added. On the other hand, the happiness component departs quite 
sharply from the traditional utility functions: 
)( fSSh =  where  0>∂
∂
f
Sm  
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Monetary remuneration and effort are no longer significant.24 When the overall degree of 
workers’ well-being is considered, effort and fairness retain their significance while the influence 
of the wage depends crucially on institutional factors since it is significant only in the public 
sector: 
),,( fewUU =   where ?=
∂
∂
w
U , 0<
∂
∂
e
U  and 0<
∂
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U  
The results are compatible with at least two interpretations of the relation between the wage 
and worker utility. In the first one, monetary remuneration enters the utility function as a mere 
acceptance level given by the participation constraint. Workers require a minimum amount of 
monetary remuneration, which is basically the opportunity cost of the time consumed on the job. 
Below this threshold level they refuse to work. Over and above the threshold, the level of 
monetary remuneration loses its ability to influence worker well-being (Borzaga and Depedri, 
2005), and other factors, such as fairness, acquire momentum. The second hypothesis, a more 
refined version of the first, states that the marginal rate of substitution between the wage and 
fairness is very low. Hence, in order to increase utility over the threshold level for the wage, a 
very high increase in monetary remuneration is needed, while fairness is more effective. Given 
the financial constraints faced by organizations, policies devoted to increasing the degree of 
fairness of procedures and distribution are likely to be more effective in imroving well-being and 
loyalty. Also this second hypothesis is supported by the data concerning wages in the Italian 
social service sector, since organizations in the public sector pay the highest wages, but workers 
are the least satisfied. In this regard, it is quite possible that the public sector suffers the lower 
level of perceived fairness. The wage increases necessary to close the gap in worker satisfaction 
                                                
24 The influence of the number of absences over the year on happiness is not considered because of its ambiguous 
meaning: the preceding analysis highlighted that this variable can proxy effort but also disaffection with the 
organization.  
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may not be compatible with financial equilibrium.25 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Theoretical work on the role of fair economic behavior has grown considerably in the last 
decades. Crucial advances have been made at theoretical level and in laboratory experiments. 
However, empirical tests of the theories of fairness within organizational settings have not been 
so exhaustive to date. Important tests have been conducted on relative status deprivation and 
group cohesiveness in for profit-enterprises. Comparative analysis of fairness is restricted to the 
role of wage dispersion, while very limited empirical tests have been performed on the non-
monetary components of fairness, such as the procedural ones. Furthermore, the linkage between 
workers’ on-the-job well-being and fairness, beyond comparison wage rates, has never been 
investigated to date.  
The concept of fairness used in this study comprises also non-monetary aspects of the job, such 
as the procedural ones, by introducing and assessing the relevance of the non-instrumental 
component in human behavior. The data, which refer to the Italian social service sector, are based 
on workers’ self-reports on the work environment and can be interpreted as the degree of fairness 
perceived in the organization. Satisfaction with the work, specified in one material and in one 
immaterial component, and loyalty, are used as success variables depending also on workers’ 
socio-demographic features and on organizational characteristics. The influence of the wage and 
                                                
25 This result is confirmed in a different way by the study by Oswald (1997, p. 1821) on unemployment: “… research 
suggests that the worst thing about losing one’s job is not the drop in take-home income. It is the non-pecuniary 
distress. To put this differently, most regression results imply that an enormous amount of extra income would be 
required to compensate people for having no work”. If the loss of the job is interpreted in terms of unfair outcomes, 
the two results become equivalent. 
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effort is evaluated together with that of fairness. The use of subjective evaluations concerning 
both satisfaction and fairness is justified by the lack of objective data and by the increasing 
consensus on the robustness of results based on subjective self-reports. Furthermore, a second 
subjective proxy for well-being (loyalty) is also used, yielding very similar results, at least in the 
case of fairness. The results evidence a crucial role by fairness concerns in influencing workers’ 
well-being. Fairness, mainly in its procedural component, emerges as the most important 
determinant of workers’ satisfaction and loyalty, while its role has been at the very least 
underestimated by past theoretical research, which considered only worker effort and the wage. 
The former proves to be of importance, while the influence of the latter is weaker and depends on 
the organizational form.  
Differences between organizational forms also appear to be relevant, justifying the idea that 
different forms are characterized by different organizational protocols and incentive mixes. If 
worker satisfaction is accepted as a relevant policy variable, attention should be paid to the way 
in which different organizational forms satisfy their workforces, and fairness emerges as a crucial 
feature in this respect. The perception of fairness is low in public organizations, but neither is it 
high in non-profit organizations. Organizations better able to satisfy workers’ desire for fairness 
will be able significantly to affect their well-being and, possibly, compliance with organizational 
objectives, over and above the effect of monetary incentives. In this respect, fairer organizational 
protocols also represent an element of competitive advantage replete with policy implications. 
Comparatively, nonprofits appear to be better suited than public sector organizations, at least in 
the social service sector. Future research will require broader comparisons which also include for-
profit enterprises and different sectors. 
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Appendix A. Questions 
SECTION II - Loyalty 
D38 What are your future intentions regarding your work for this organization? 
8. I intend to stay with the organization as long as possible 
9. I intend to stay with the organization for some years 
10. I shall leave the organization if a better opportunity presents itself in the same sector 
11. I shall leave the organization if a better opportunity presents itself even in a different sector 
12. Whatever happens, I shall leave the organization as soon as I can 
 
SECTION III – Satisfaction 
INSTRUCTIONS: We would now ask you to give an assessment of your work for the 
organization. 
Please answer the following questions by marking the number you choose with a cross. 
To what extent are you satisfied with: 
Assessment on a scale from 1 (dissatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied) 
1. Your work as a whole 
2. The opportunities for training/professional development offered by the organization  
3. The amount of decision-making/functional freedom given to you 
4. Appreciation of your work by others 
5. The variety and creativity of your work 
6. Your physical work environment (safety, comfort, etc.) 
7. The usefulness of your work for the beneficiaries of the services provided 
8. Your salary 
9. Your working hours 
10. Your career advancement thus far in the organization 
11. Your future prospects of career advancement in the organization 
12. Your job security 
13. Your relationships with your superiors 
14. Your relationships with your paid work colleagues 
15. Your relationships with your voluntary work colleagues 
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SECTION IV – The work environment 
INSTRUCTIONS: There now follows a series of statements about the work environment of an 
organization. 
Please state the extent to which the following statements describe features of the organization for 
which you work, marking the number you choose with a cross. 
Assessment on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (entirely) 
1. In this organization workers are paid according to the quality and quantity of the results 
produced 
2. In this organization workers are told everything they need to know in order to do their work 
properly 
3. In this organization employees who do their jobs well have good prospects of professional 
development and career advancement 
4. My superiors pay close attention to my ideas and suggestions 
5. In this organization workers are given opportunities to improve their skills 
6. In this organization promotions are decided in order to help the best workers to reach the 
highest positions 
7. The workers of this organization would be more committed to their work if they were paid 
better 
8. In this organization you often work in sub-standard safety conditions 
9. Working for this organization causes stress and tension 
SECTION V – Treatment by the organization 
INSTRUCTIONS: The purpose of this section is to find out what you think about your economic 
treatment by the organization in relation to certain aspects. 
Please assess each of the following statements by marking the number you choose with a cross. 
To what extent do you feel adequately paid… 
Assessment on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (entirely) 
…considering the responsibilities that you have 
… considering your qualifications and training 
… considering your experience 
… considering your commitment 
… considering the quality of your work 
… considering the stress and tension caused by your work 
… considering the economic circumstances of the organization  
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Appendix B.  
Grouping the items of satisfaction (principal components analysis)a  
Rotated Component Matrix Component 
  1 2 3 
 relational and 
extrinsic 
incentives 
intrinsic 
incentives 
economic 
incentives 
professional development  .664  
decision-making autonomy  .712  
recognition of one’s contribution  .688  
variety and creativity of the job  .713  
working environment .568   
the social usefulness of the job  .486  
the salary .485  .494 
working hours .636   
previous career advancements   .842 
future career advancements   .833 
job security .694   
relations with superiors .639   
relations with colleagues .647   
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a  Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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Total Variance Explained 
 
Componen
t Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
  Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.392 33.783 33.783 2.557 19.666 19.666
2 1.476 11.355 45.138 2.514 19.337 39.003
3 1.096 8.429 53.567 1.893 14.564 53.567
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Scree Plot
Component Number
13121110987654321
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Component Matrix(a) 
  Component 
  1 2 3 
Professional development .629    
decision-making autonomy .642   -.364
Recognition of one’s contribution .669   -.330
variety and creativity of the job .601   -.406
working environment .621    
the social usefulness of the job .526    
the salary .548   .423
working hours .586    
previous career advancements .541 -.615 .303
future career advancements .525 -.615  
job security .444 .451  
relations with superiors .633 .320  
relations with colleagues .551 .405  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 3 components extracted. 
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Table 1. Organizational typologies and their workers 
 Organizations Workers 
 No. Percent No. Percent 
Public ownership 54 23.7 585 28.3 
Non-profit 157 68.9 1193 57.7 
Other* 17 7.4 288 13,9 
Total 228 100 2066 100 
This category encloses for-profit firms (17 organizations and 180 workers, plus 108 cases for 
which the organizational form was not recorded). 
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Table 2. Workers’ characteristics (average) 
 
To
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l 
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p 
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Gender      
Male 0.229 0.156 0.284 0.149 
Female 0.771 0.844 0.716 0.851 
Age     
Up to 30 years old 0.388 0.267 0.447 0.389 
31 to 50 years old 0.495 0.610 0.439 0.493 
51 or older  0.117 0.123 0.114 0.118 
Educational attainment      
Up to lower intermediate diploma 0.268 0.223 0.261 0.390 
High-school diploma 0.567 0.647 0.542 0.509 
University degree or higher 0.165 0.130 0.197 0.101 
Specific training 0.585 0.744 0.508 0.438 
Contractual relation     
Part-time 0.248 0.256 0.244 0.194 
Full-time 0.752 0.744 0.756 0.806 
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Table 3. Workers’ pay in the social services sector (average values in Euros) 
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Monthly pay (full-time)*** 774.39 852,96 733,05 788,44 
Standard deviation 
212,24 229,31 199,03 178,21 
Standard deviation/Monthly pay 
0,274 0,269 0,272 0,226 
Hourly pay (full-time)*** 5.43 5,82 5,13 5,27 
Standard deviation 
2,21 1,50 1,38 1,34 
Standard deviation/Hourly pay 
0,407 0,258 0,270 0,254 
(***) ANOVA significant at the 1% level 
(a) Standard deviation for hourly wages was calculated by eliminating outlying values above 
20 Euros per hour worked. This adjustment reduced dispersion in the non-profit sector, 
but not in the public sector.         
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Table 4. Workers’ effort proxied by number of extra work-hours and absentee workdays 
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Effective weekly work-hours in excess 
of contractual weekly work-hours* 
1.324 1.316 1.424 0.928 
Number of non-vacation absentee 
work-days over the year*** 
11.036 15.986 8.827 10.100 
(*) (***) ANOVA significant respectively at the 10% level and at the 1% level 
 46
 
Table 5. Worker satisfaction (average)a 
Satisfaction with … 
To
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The job as a whole 5.268 4.995 5.368 5.402 
     
Items of material satisfaction     
work environment*** 4.475 4.049 4.612 4.778 
wage* 4.070 3.996 4.064 4.247 
working hours*** 4.810 4.573 4.962 4.653 
past career advancement*** 3.744 2.407 3.443 3.023 
future career advancements*** 2.931 2.215 3.275 2.893 
job security*** 4.699 4.699 4.561 5.270 
Material utility (average)*** 4.056 3.593 4.171 4.213 
     
Items of happiness     
professional development*** 4.504 4.138 4.789 4.048 
decision-making autonomy*** 4.360 3.947 4.599 4.188 
recognition of one’s contribution*** 4.540 4.138 4.759 4.444 
 47
variety and creativity of the job*** 4.631 4.382 4.820 4.346 
the usefulness of the job for beneficiaries 5.313 5.190 5.364 5.351 
relations with superiors*** 5.169 4.677 5.361 5.359 
relations with colleagues*** 5.514 5.211 5.622 5.672 
relations with volunteers*** 4,475 4.085 4.575 4.575 
Happiness (average)*** 4.843 4.530 5.014 4.771 
     
Average, all items of satisfaction 4.500 4.187 4.646 4.534 
(a)The interviewees chose a value on a scale from 1 (minimum) to 7 (maximum). 
(***), (*), ANOVA significant respectively at the 1% level and 10% level 
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Table 6. Loyalty to the organization (percent) 
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Intend to stay as long as possible 0.518 0.446 0.542 0.564 
Intend to stay at least for some years 0.134 0.127 0.143 0.113 
Quit the organization if a better job opportunity in 
the same sector is found 
0.162 0.216 0.141 0.142 
Quit the organization if a better job opportunity also 
in a different in sector is found 
0.170 0.175 0.167 0.177 
Leave the organization as soon as possible  0.015 0.037 0.008 0.004 
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Table 7. Items of distributive fairness in relations (average scores) a 
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Responsibility*** 3.977 3.545 4.190 3.971 
Training*** 3.989 3.582 4.185 4.004 
Experience*** 3.979 3.580 4.142 4.107 
Effort*** 3.818 3.361 4.017 3.919 
Quality of the work*** 3.885 3.431 4.078 4.007 
Stress and tension*** 3.401 2.991 3.633 3.274 
Economic resources of the 
organization*** 
4.211 3.457 4.690 3.709 
Average score *** 3.926 3.450 4.169 3.878 
 (a)The interviewees chose a value on a Lickert scale from 1 (minimum) to 7 (maximum). 
(***) ANOVA significant at the 1% level 
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Table 8. Items of procedural fairness (average scores) a 
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Balance incentives/contribution***  3.068 2.428 3.324 3.265 
Communication*** 4.461 3.817 4.693 4.773 
Professional growth and career*** 3.126 2.204 3.576 3.080 
Being listened to*** 4.065 3.239 4.452 4.090 
Growth of skills and capabilities*** 4.098 3.300 4.527 3.879 
Transparency of promotions*** 2.946 2.078 3.356 2.968 
Average score*** 3.674 2.892 4.033 3.729 
(a)The interviewees chose a value on a Lickert scale from 1 (minimum) to 7 (maximum). 
(***) ANOVA significant at the 1% level 
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Table 9. Worker well-being and fairness. All organizations  
 
Average satisfaction with 
the job (linear regression) 
Material satisfaction  
(linear regression) 
Happiness  
(linear regression) 
Overall satisfaction with the 
job (ordered logit) 
Variables Coeff. t P>|t| Coeff. t P>|t| Coeff. t P>|t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
z P>|z| 
Gender c 0.086 2.10 0.036 0.119 2.33 0.020 0.040 0.85 0.394 1.146 1.40 0.161 
Age (years) a 0.003 1.33 0.182 -0.002 -0.66 0.507 0.006 2.51 0.012 1.008 1.60 0.111 
High-school diploma c 0.039 0.94 0.348 -0.101 -1.96 0.050 0.165 3.46 0.001 1.054 0.52 0.605 
University degree or higher c 0.028 0.50 0.615 -0.186 -2.72 0.007 0.201 3.18 0.002 0.775 -1.94 0.053 
Specific training c -0.138 -3.34 0.001 -0.088 -1.72 0.086 -0.174 -3.64 0.000 0.624 -4.83 0.000 
Open-end contract c 0.044 1.11 0.266 0.302 6.17 0.000 -0.142 -3.12 0.002 0.884 -1.31 0.192 
Tenure in the organization (years) a 0.004 1.46 0.144 0.008 2.50 0.013 0.001 0.34 0.731 1.000 0.01 0.990 
Log-Age organization (years) 0.064 2.84 0.005 0.135 4.80 0.000 0.002 0.06 0.951 1.063 1.13 0.256 
Log-Size of the organization 
(number of employees) 
-0.067 -4.32 0.000 -0.061 -3.18 0.001 -0.069 -3.87 0.000 0.929 -1.98 0.048 
Effort (extra hours worked) -0.007 -2.01 0.045 -0.021 -4.52 0.000 0.003 0.70 0.482 0.997 -0.36 0.716 
Number of absences over the year 0.001 1.56 0.118 0.000 0.76 0.448 0.001 1.96 0.050 1.003 2.28 0.022 
Hourly wage a 0.006 0.77 0.444 0.021 2.06 0.039 -0.007 -0.71 0.480 0.99 -0.53 0.598 
Distributive fairness b 0.162 12.40 0.000 0.213 13.15 0.000 0.115 7.63 0.000 1.281 7.61 0.000 
Procedural fairness d 0.411 30.36 0.000 0.401 23.86 0.000 0.409 26.24 0.000 1.670 14.76 0.000 
Constant 2.208 13.34 0.000 0.901 4.39 0.000 3.301 17.30 0.000    
 
Number of obs. = 2061 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.5244 
Number of obs. = 2061 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.4568 
Number of obs. = 2061 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0. 4241 
Number of obs. = 2061 
Log likelihood = -3254.5831 
LR chi2 (14) = 584.09 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
 52
Table 10. Worker well-being and fairness. Public sector  
 
Average satisfaction with 
the job (linear regression) 
Material satisfaction (linear 
regression) 
Happiness 
(linear regression) 
Overall satisfaction with the 
job (ordered logit) 
Variables Coeff. t P>|t| Coeff. t P>|t| Coeff. t P>|t| 
Odds 
Ratio 
z P>|z| 
Gender c 0.061 0.65 0.518 0.077 0.70 0.484 0.039 0.34 0.736 1.323 1.33 0.184 
Age (years) a 0.007 1.57 0.118 0.000 0.01 0.992 0.014 2.45 0.015 1.015 1.31 0.190 
High-school diploma c -0.022 -0.25 0.801 -0.174 -1.72 0.085 0.094 0.89 0.373 0.944 -0.27 0.786 
University degree or higher c -0.116 -0.93 0.353 -0.360 -2.49 0.013 0.038 0.25 0.802 0.516 -2.27 0.023 
Specific training c -0.212 -2.31 0.021 -0.092 -0.87 0.384 -0.280 -2.52 0.012 0.541 -2.97 0.003 
Open-end contract c -0.101 -1.27 0.206 0.210 2.29 0.023 -0.300 -3.13 0.002 0.543 -3.21 0.001 
Tenure in the organization (years) a 0.006 1.21 0.226 0.015 2.52 0.012 -0.003 -0.41 0.685 1.003 0.22 0.824 
Log-Age organization (years) 0.039 0.76 0.446 0.085 1.43 0.152 -0.013 -0.21 0.835 0.947 -0.48 0.630 
Log-Size of the organization 
(number of employees) 
-0.152 -4.13 0.000 -0.151 -3.54 0.000 -0.155 -3.48 0.001 0.957 -0.52 0.604 
Effort (extra hours worked) -0.015 -1.65 0.100 -0.038 -3.71 0.000 0.003 0.31 0.759 0.979 -1.08 0.279 
Number of absences over the year 0.001 1.65 0.099 0.001 1.48 0.141 0.001 1.41 0.159 1.004 2.16 0.031 
Hourly wage a 0.039 1.78 0.075 0.071 2.79 0.005 0.018 0.69 0.493 1.034 0.64 0.525 
Distributive fairness b 0.158 6.48 0.000 0.223 7.93 0.000 0.094 3.21 0.001 1.155 2.51 0.012 
Procedural fairness d 0.422 15.44 0.000 0.351 11.09 0.000 0.451 13.63 0.000 1.991 9.74 0.000 
Constant 2.648 6.83 0.000 1.350 3.01 0.003 3.735 7.96 0.000    
 
Number of obs. = 582 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0. 5120 
Number of obs. = 582 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.4573 
Number of obs. = 582 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0. 4005 
Number of obs. = 567 
Log likelihood = -881.88638 
LR chi2 (14) = 202.94 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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Table 11. Worker well-being and fairness. Non-profit organizations 
 
Average satisfaction with 
the job (linear regression) 
Material satisfaction (linear 
regression) 
Happiness 
(linear regression) 
Overall satisfaction with the 
job (ordered logit) 
Variables Coeff. t P>[t] Coeff. t P>[t] Coeff. t P>[t] 
Odds 
Ratio 
z P>|z| 
Gender c 0.111 2.28 0.023 0.143 2.28 0.023 0.066 1.20 0.229 1043 0.35 0.724 
Age (years) a 0.002 0.66 0.510 -0.005 -1.41 0.158 0.006 2.08 0.037 1.010 1.48 0.138 
High-school diploma c 0.095 1.77 0.077 -0.080 -1.16 0.245 0.256 4.26 0.000 1.271 1.73 0.083 
University degree or higher c 0.076 1.15 0.252 -0.161 -1.87 0.062 0.270 3.61 0.000 1.033 0.19 0.847 
Specific training c -0.137 -2.67 0.008 -0.073 -1.09 0.275 -0.190 -3.30 0.001 0.576 -4.32 0.000 
Open-end contract c 0.090 1.78 0.075 0.293 4.50 0.000 -0.063 -1.12 0.262 1.080 0.62 0.537 
Tenure in the organization (years) a 0.003 0.72 0.469 0.006 1.26 0.209 0.002 0.49 0.624 1.001 0.08 0.936 
Log-Age organization (years) 0.086 2.86 0.004 0.216 5.57 0.000 -0.017 -0.51 0.613 1.074 0.95 0.341 
Log-Size of the organization 
(number of employees) 
-0.055 -3.07 0.002 -0.064 -2.76 0.006 -0.044 -2.19 0.028 0.895 -2.44 0.015 
Effort (extra hours worked) -0.005 -1.28 0.199 -0.015 -2.74 0.006 0.002 0.42 0.672 0.997 -0.27 0.784 
Number of absences over the year 0.000 0.33 0.740 -0.001 -0.85 0.396 0.001 1.49 0.137 1.001 0.71 0.476 
Hourly wage a 0.001 0.09 0.931 0.010 0.66 0.507 -0.011 -0.88 0.380 0.977 -0.83 0.405 
Distributive fairness b 0.169 9.88 0.000 0.218 9.89 0.000 0.125 6.51 0.000 1.342 6.59 0.000 
Procedural fairness d 0.387 21.53 0.000 0.400 17.21 0.000 0.375 18.56 0.000 1.655 10.51 0.000 
Constant 2.071 10.43 0.000 0.713 2.78 0.006 3.189 14.31 0.000    
 
Number of obs. = 1181 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0. 5113 
Number of obs. = 1181 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0. 4498 
Number of obs. = 1181 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0. 4101 
Number of obs. = 1181 
Log likelihood = -1815.237 
LR chi2 (14) = 350.46 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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Table 12. Worker loyalty to the organization and fairness (ordered logit estimates)  
 All organizations Public sector Non-profit organizations 
Variables 
Odds 
ratios 
Z P>[Z] 
Odds 
ratios 
Z P>[Z] 
Odds 
ratios 
Z P>[Z] 
Gender c 1.074 0.67 0.501 1.126 0.54 0.590 1.087 0.62 0.532 
Age (years) a 1.032 5.53 0.000 1.032 2.69 0.007 1.035 4.70 0.000 
High-school diploma c 0.631 -4.16 0.000 0.758 -1.29 0.198 0.634 -3.01 0.003 
University degree or higher c 0.58 -3.82 0.000 0.46 -2.67 0.008 0.688 -2.00 0.046 
Specific training c 0.953 -0.46 0.645 1.286 1.17 0.242 0.77 -1.89 0.058 
Open-end contract c 0.97 -0.30 0.765 0.729 -1.66 0.097 1.194 1.30 0.192 
Tenure in the organization (years) a 1.003 0.42 0.677 0.998 -0.12 0.903 1.017 1.59 0.112 
Log-Age of organization (years) 107 1.14 0.255 1.118 0.95 0.344 0.956 -0.55 0.581 
Log-Size of the organization (number of employees) 0.93 -1.88 0.060 0.855 -1.87 0.062 0.937 -1.37 0.171 
Effort (extra hours worked) 0.995 -0.55 0.580 0.951 -2.33 0.020 1.006 0.54 0.587 
Number of absences over the year 0.997 -2.70 0.007 0.998 -1.05 0.294 0.996 -2.16 0.031 
Hourly wage a 0.985 -0.76 0.448 0.965 -0.76 0.450 0.97 -1.07 0.285 
Distributive fairness b 1.290 7.43 0.000 1.331 4.84 0.000 1.256 4.76 0.000 
Procedural fairness d 1.327 7.90 0.000 1.128 1.84 0.066 1.502 7.94 0.000 
 
Number of obs. = 2061 
Log likelihood = -2466.4848 
LR chi2 (14) = 361.66 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Number of obs. = 582 
Log likelihood = -769.61562 
LR chi2 (14) = 93.56 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Number of obs. = 1181 
Log likelihood = -1334.1554 
LR chi2 (14) = 261.31 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
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